Background. In early 2009, a dairy-goat annex care farm in South Limburg, the Netherlands, reported 220 Coxiella burnetii-related abortions in 450 pregnant goats. These preceded human cases and occurred in a region that was Q-fever free before 2009, providing a unique quasi-experimental setting for investigating regional transmission patterns associated with a Q-fever point source.
but potentially fatal, mostly occurring in patients with heart valve or vascular anomalies. Sheep, goats, and cattle are considered the most common reservoirs. Coxiella burnetii is shed in birth material from infected animals. Inhalation of aerosolized particles is thought to be the primary transmission route. Coxiella burnetii is deemed a potential bioterrorism agent because of its low infectious dose and environmental resilience [4] . In the Netherlands, rapid intensification of dairy-goat husbandry contributed to the largest multisource Q-fever outbreak worldwide with >4000 notified human cases between 2007 and 2010 [5] . Studies attempting to link human cases to individual sources during this outbreak faced difficulties owing to their retrospective nature, widespread environmental dispersion of C. burnetii, multiple overlapping sources, cumulative seroprevalences [5] [6] [7] , and predominance of a single C. burnetii genotype [8] . In contrast, the outbreak we present featured an isolated veterinary source, identified preceding human cases, and was located in an area virtually Q-fever free, providing us with a unique quasi-experimental setting for systematic assessment of transmission patterns associated with a Q-fever point source.
METHODS

Study Area
This was the catchment area of one of the largest Dutch general hospitals, located in South Limburg, the Netherlands (346 km 2 , 12 municipalities, 308 000 inhabitants).
Veterinary Investigation
Goat and sheep farms were identified using data from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture, and Innovation. In 2009, the study area counted 3679 goats (114 holdings, including 3 large dairy-goat farms with 3136 goats) and 7629 sheep (311 holdings). The index farm, a care farm with 37 residents and employees, was the second largest dairy-goat holding in the area, housing 1135 unvaccinated goats in a deep-litter stable with open sidewall vents. First abortions occurred around 1 February 2009 (week 5), marking the beginning of our study period. Coxiella burnetii DNA was detected in abortion material, milk, and manure by polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Other common causes of infectious abortions were excluded. Abortions exceeded the 5% cutoff for veterinary notification, mandatory since June 2008. The South Limburg Public Health Service (PHS) was notified on 24 March 2009. The third largest dairy-goat farm (676 goats) tested PCR-positive when bulk-milk monitoring became mandatory in October 2009. The largest dairy-goat farm remained bulk-milk negative. Between April and July 2009, the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority screened a sample (n = 97) of petting zoos for C. burnetii, including 2 from our study area, using PCR on caprine and ovine swabs. In December 2009, Dutch authorities implemented nationwide measures (ie, mandatory vaccination, culling of pregnant animals on infected dairy-goat and -sheep farms) to curb the outbreak [5] . By 30 April 2010, 95% of all index-farm goats had been culled, marking the end of our study period.
Epidemiological Investigation
Subjects Closely Related to the Index Farm Following veterinary notification, we immediately approached all subjects closely related to the index farm (traced back until 1 February 2009) for Q-fever seroscreening (Table 1: (1) farm residents/employees (n = 37), (2) farm visitors (n = 58), and (3) household contacts of subjects from (1) and (2) reporting no direct contact with the index farm (n = 16 
Laboratory-Confirmed Community Cases and Geographic
Information System Analysis Human Q fever has been notifiable in the Netherlands since 1975. Fever, pneumonia, or hepatitis with seroevidence of recent infection were notification criteria at the time of the outbreak. We defined community cases as laboratory-confirmed symptomatic notified subjects resident in the study area consulting a physician for Q-fever testing from February 2009 through April 2010, without evident relation to the index farm. The first community case from our study area consulted a general practitioner (GP) on 3 April and was confirmed on 14 April 2009. Symptom onset in community cases was self-reported and could predate the day of first GP visit. To characterize spatial distribution of community cases in relation to the farm and other putative sources, we performed geographic information system (GIS)-based analysis using ArcGIS 9 software (ESRI, Redlands, California). Using georeferenced residential addresses as a proxy of community exposure, cases were plotted as point data on a digital map, along with goat and sheep farm locations. Two-dimensional P-splines were used for incidence smoothing [9] . Exposure-response gradients for several putative sources (index farm, 2 other major dairygoat holdings, 2 positive petting zoos) were statistically assessed using linear regression with log-transformed attack rates, based on curve estimates suggesting exponential decrease of attack rates with distance from the index farm. Data on wind strength and direction from February through May 2009 were provided by the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute.
Overall Incidence of Infections
True incidence, including undetected infections, was estimated by observed increase in pre-versus postoutbreak seroprevalence in 2 convenience samples from the study area (396 healthy b Clinical attack rate, or the proportion of individuals seropositive for acute infection who also had clinical illness including fever (%).
c Difference significant at the .05 level with regard to the target population (general population in study area or index farm's municipality).
d Difference significant at the .05 level with regard to the other seroprevalence sample.
e Relative risk in household contacts of index farm residents/employees/visitors and index farm visitors versus index farm residents/employees.
f Difference significant at the .05 level with regard to index farm residents and employees.
Massive Point-Source Outbreak of Q Fever • CID 2012:55 (15 December) • 1593 adults vaccinated for healthcare-related hepatitis B risk in 2008, and 410 adults attending the regional sexual health clinic from January through April 2010). We used multivariate logistic regression for comparison, adjusting for age, sex, and resident location of subjects by municipality. True near-farm incidence was estimated by IgM seroprevalence in a small sample of patients (n = 42) consulting a GP located in the farm's municipality from August through October 2009 with symptoms other than those associated with Q fever, requiring blood sampling for reasons other than Q fever, and consenting to Q-fever screening.
Environmental Investigation
In April and July 2009, we took surface swabs and aerosol samples (using a Sartorius MD8 Airport with nitrate-cellulose filters) from the index farm's stable. In April, May, and July 2009, we also collected 4 aerosol samples at radial distances of 1000 m from the farm in the 4 cardinal directions. In 2010, 8 follow-up aerosol samples each were obtained in June, July, and September 2010 at distances of 1 km and 2 km in the 4 cardinal directions.
Laboratory Investigation
Laboratory tests were performed according to manufacturers' protocols. Pre-and post-outbreak seroprevalence sera were screened for anti-Coxiella phase II IgG by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA; Serion ELISA classic, Institut Virion/ Serion GmbH, Würzburg, Germany). Positive (>30 U/mL) and indeterminate (20-30 U/mL) samples were further tested for phase II IgM (absorbance >10% above extinction of the cutoff control) by Serion ELISA classic, and for phase I and II IgM and IgG (1:16) by immunofluorescence assay (IFA) (C. burnetii IFA IgM/IgG Test Kit, Fuller Laboratories, Fullerton, California). All other subjects, including community cases, were screened for IgG-and IgM-type antibodies to phase I and phase II C. burnetii antigen by Serion ELISA classic. Acute infections were defined by presence of anti-Coxiella phase II IgM, with or without phase II IgG, or C. burnetii DNA in PCR (cycle threshold ≤36) routinely performed on all samples seronegative on initial testing [10] . Environmental samples were tested using a multiplex quantitative PCR including 2 C. burnetii-specific target sequences (IS1111 and com1) developed by the Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment. Because the genome of C. burnetii contains multiple copies of IS1111 [11] , amplification of this target is expected to precede that of single-copy target com1. In our samples positive for both com1 and IS1111, quantification cycle (Cq) values for IS1111 were consistently lower than those for com1, and lower than those for IS1111 in samples positive for IS1111 only. Accordingly, samples were classified as "high-load" (detection of IS1111 + com1), "low-load" (IS1111 only), or negative (no signal
RESULTS
Veterinary Investigation
Abortions on the index farm lasted from week 5 to week 13 in 2009, totaling 220 in 450 pregnant goats (49%). The bulkmilk-positive dairy-goat farm, 6.7 km west-northwest of the index farm, reported no C. burnetii-related abortions; neither did the third (bulk-milk-negative) dairy-goat farm, 5.1 km north-northwest of the index farm (Figure 1 ), or any other goat or sheep holding in the area. Both petting zoos screened positive: one, 10.2 km north-northeast of the index farm, housed 6 sheep and 9 goats (10/15 positive), the other, 8.9 km northeast of the index farm, housed 12 sheep and 2 goats (3/ 14 positive, including both goats).
Epidemiological Investigation
The total number of laboratory-confirmed acute infections was 319 (Table 1) .
Index Farm Residents/Employees, Visitors, and Their Household Contacts Serological attack rate increased with presumed exposure intensity. It was highest in farm residents/employees (92%), and significantly lower in farm visitors (56%) and household contacts (50%). The proportion of persons seropositive for acute infection who also had clinical illness was ≥80% in all 3 groups. Overall, 20% (12/59) of subjects with acute infection were seroconverters; 7% (4/59) were phase II IgM positive but IgG negative on initial testing, suggesting very recent infection. Eight seropositive farm visitors reported visiting the farm just once, 3 for just 1 hour. 
Subjects Related to Other Farms
Epidemic Curves
Illness in farm-related cases peaked in week 11, approximately 2 weeks after the abortion storm's midperiod ( Figure 2 ). Assuming an average 14-day incubation period, this is consistent with recent on-farm exposure. Community cases peaked in week 19, possibly reflecting lower exposure dose and time required for environmental dispersion of C. burnetii.
Geographical Incidence Distribution Based on Notified Community Cases
Notified community cases (n = 253) were scattered mostly downwind from the index farm over a wedge-shaped area whose longitudinal axis coincided with the southwesterly wind direction prevailing from 1 February through 31 May 2009 ( Figure 1 ). Incidence increased with proximity to the index farm, following an exposure-response gradient statistically significant in linear regression (P < .001) ( Table 2 ). Exposure-response patterns for other farms investigated were statistically nonsignificant at the P < .05 level, and/or incompatible with their putative point-source role (attack rates increasing with distance from the farm). Incidence in the 5-km high-risk zone around the index farm was 394 per 100 000 and dropped to 48 per 100 000 in the 5-to 10-km zone. 
Overall Incidence of Infections
Environmental Investigation
In 2009, C. burnetii DNA was detected in all surface and aerosol samples from the index farm's stable (17/17) . Of all aerosol samples collected at radial distances of 1000 m from the farm, 92% (11/12) were positive. Cq values for single-copy target com1 and multicopy target IS1111 suggest that C. burnetii DNA content in stable air was higher than in the farm's surroundings. In 2009, all but one of the samples scored high-load. In 2010, C. burnetii DNA was still found, albeit at low-load levels, in aerosols obtained within 2-km distances from the farm (33% [8/ 24] ), indicative of long-term environmental persistence.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Linking a single dairy-goat farm to a cluster of human Q-fever cases, we provide novel insights into transmission patterns associated with a Q-fever point source, revealing massive numbers of undetected infections across the entire study area, with high on-farm and community attack rates, even beyond the 5-km zone designated high-risk by Dutch authorities in 2010. Counting the 319 laboratory-confirmed acute infections alone, we also present one of the largest single-point source outbreaks of Q fever ever reported [6, [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . Several findings from our study implicate the index farm as the primary and likely sole source. First, evidence suggests a spatial relationship. GIS mapping revealed scattering of community cases downwind from the index farm, following a statistically significant exposure-response gradient, whereas association with other putative sources was statistically nonsignificant or implausible. On-farm serological attack rates were surprisingly high, increasing with presumed exposure intensity and approaching 100% in residents and employees. Bacterial load was higher on-farm than in the farm's surroundings. In addition, the index farm was the only holding reporting C. burnetii-related abortions under mandatory notification, suggesting increased transmission risk for humans compared to holdings without abortions [24] . Second, temporal sequence was consistent with the index farm's presumed point-source role: preversus postoutbreak seroprevalence was low; index-farm abortions and cases preceded community cases. Although causality must not be inferred from individual findings, evidence as a whole suggests that infections were linked to the index farm. High attack rates and incidence of undetected infections may reflect high levels of C. burnetii output from the farm, (A. de Bruin, unpublished data, 2012). Our study had several limitations. First, we used ELISA for detection of C. burnetii IgM. Given a reported 85.7% sensitivity, [10, 25] we may have underestimated attack rates in high-risk subjects closely related to the index farm, while 97.6% specificity may imply false positives in settings of lower seroprevalence (community cases) [3, 26] . However, all community cases, by definition, had compatible symptoms; 11% (40/253) were detected by PCR, and 65% (139/213) of remaining cases were also seropositive on follow-up. Positive pre-and postoutbreak seroprevalence results were reproduced by IFA according to standard Figure 2 . Numbers of index farm-related and notified community cases based on date of disease onset per calendar week. b No. of Q-fever cases per 100 000 population in a given 1-km concentric circle around the putative source.
c Attack rate in a given 1-km perimeter divided by AR in the outermost (9-10 km = reference) concentric circle around the putative source, with 95% CI.
d Case/pop: no. of cases divided by population in corresponding concentric circle.
e Bulk-milk-positive dairy-goat farm, no abortions.
f Bulk-milk negative dairy-goat farm, no abortions. procedures. Second, our true incidence estimate was based on 2 convenience samples. Sampling criteria-healthcare-related hepatitis B risk in 2008 and sexually transmitted infection risk in 2010-were different, but unlikely to compromise internal validity through selection bias, as they do not seem differentially associated with risk of Q-fever exposure or infection. External validity may be affected by sampling bias, with healthy, active adults being overrepresented relative to the target population. However, this group also represents the majority of the general population. Yet, we cannot rule out that incidence in certain parts of the population (eg, those confined to the indoors because of sickness or immobility) was below (or above) our estimate. We had no clinical data differentiating between acute and past resolved infections in seropositive individuals; however, most positive postoutbreak sample seroprofiles were consistent with recent infection. High IgM seroprevalence in our near-farm sample was likewise suggestive of a genuine rise in recent infections. Low ratio of notified to undetected incident infections is consistent with findings from another Dutch study, performed in a multiple-source setting [27] . Third, GIS analysis may be prone to notification bias through preferential self-reporting and detection of cases living closer to the index farm. However, this effect is likely negligible, as public and practitioners were frequently alerted to the risk of countywide spread of Q fever, suggesting that geographical differences in testing rates were random. Fourth, we lack proof that the C. burnetii strains recovered from human and caprine material from our study area match, and thus are presently confined to conclusions based on epidemiological evidence. However, current molecular data suggest that a single strain of C. burnetii was predominant in the Dutch outbreak, rendering a potential match less meaningful [8] . Fifth, we had no travel data excluding infections incurred outside the study area. Indeed, a proportion of seropositives may have contracted Q fever elsewhere. However, we may also have missed even larger numbers of cases who lived elsewhere but contracted Q fever in our study area, a popular tourist destination from early spring to late summer. More importantly, GPs from the remaining municipalities in our county, whose population roughly equals that in our study area, reported no more than 7 cases in the study period, whereas comparison of pre-versus postoutbreak seroprevalence analogous to that performed in our study area showed no significant rise for these municipalities. It is unlikely that residents in these municipalities should have traveled significantly less than those in our study area. If travel had been an important contributing factor, we would expect cases/seropositives to be evenly distributed over the entire county. Sixth, it may also be argued that infections were incurred prior to 2009 and indexfarm abortions, suggesting they were unrelated to the farm. However, significant transmission in the study area prior to 2009 seems unlikely for several reasons, including our low preoutbreak seroprevalence. Disease onset in the vast majority of notified community cases (all symptomatic by definition, with many seroconverters or PCR-positives, suggesting very recent infection) followed index-farm abortions, and so did GP reporting of cases, despite extensive national media coverage and increased public Q-fever awareness since 2008. Clinical attack rates in subjects closely related to the index farm were high and onset compatible with recent on-farm transmission. Disease onset predating index-farm abortions in a few cases may be explained by other putative agents (ranging from common cold to influenza), recall bias, or low-scale on-farm transmission due to bacterial shedding preceding abortions. Seventh, and most important, parameters, such as veterinary abortion rates, meteorological conditions, landscape, vegetation, and soil humidity, may influence the dynamics of any Q-fever outbreak [28] . Such parameters, subject to temporal and regional variation, may have played a substantial role in this outbreak, compromising generalizability of our study. In summary, notified Q-fever cases may-even in point-source settings-represent a gross underestimate of true incidence of infections, with only a small minority of infected subjects seeking medical attention. A low threshold of clinical suspicion should be maintained under such circumstances, particularly in patients with increased risk of chronic Q fever. Although incidence correlated with farm proximity, high attack rates were also found beyond 5 km from the source. Unpublished data suggest that spillover even took place into neighboring Germany. Public health efforts therefore should follow a wider regional/crossborder rather than local approach, even at the earliest stage of an outbreak. This may be even more true for intentional release of C. burnetii, where bacterial dose may well exceed that encountered in "natural" disasters, and large-scale vaccination and chemoprophylaxis may be considered [4, 29] .
Notes
